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CASE AND COMMENT
Labour Law  —  Labour Relations A ct —  N o-strike Clause —  injunction 
Involuntary Servitude —  Due Process
T he la test and  m ost au th o rita tiv e  o f  a series o f  recent C an ad ian  
decisions, in w hich the equ itab le  principles underly ing the  use o f  the 
lab o u r in junction  have been considered ,1 I.B .E .W . Local 2085, et at. 
v. Winnipeg Builders' Exchange et al,2 is an  interesting  illustration  
o f  jud ic ia l m oulding o f  the s ta tu te  law to  satisfy the con tem porary  
needs o f  society. C artw righ t, C . J. C ., speaking fo r the  unanim ous 
Suprem e C o u rt, unequivocally  held th a t b reach o f  a no-strike clause 
o f  a collective agreem ent and  vio lation  o f  the M an itoba L ab o u r 
R ela tions A ct3 is conduc t w hich no t only a  union bu t its individual 
m em bers m ay be restra ined  from  continu ing  by an  ex  parte  in te r­
locu to ry  injunction. T he possible extent o f  th is new and  necessary 
developm ent in C anad ian  lab o u r law will be considered in rela tion  
to  the relevant legal and  equ itab le doctrines.
T he appeal4 was based on the  equitab le principle th a t C hancery  
will n o t perm it the specific perform ance o f  con trac ts  o f  personal 
service. F ounded  on the due process clause o f  M agna Charta, th is 
principle has been reiterated  on  num erous occasions, no tab ly  in 
Lumley v. Wagner5 and  Warner Brothers v. Nelson .6
In dism issing the appeal, the p redom inan t principle present in 
the  ju d g m en t o f  the S uprem e C o u rt was th a t:
. . .  the purposes o f the Labour Relations Act would be in large 
measure defeated if the Court were to say that it is powerless to 
restrain the continuation o f a strike engaged in in direct violation 
of the terms o f a collective agreement binding on the striking em­
ployees and in breach o f the express provisions o f the Act.7
C hief Justice C artw righ t co n tin u ed :
There is a real difference between saying to one individual that he 
must go on working for another individual and saying to a group 
bound by a collective agreement, that they must not take concerted
1 Collected and discussed in Winnipeg Builders' Exchange et al, v. I.B.E.W., 
Local Union 2085, et al. (1966), 57 D .L.R . (2d) 141 (Man., C.A.).
2 [1967] S.C.R. 628, 65 D .L.R . (2d) 242, a f t ’g (1966), 57 D .L.R . (2d) 141 
(Man., C.A.).
3 R.S.M ., 1954, c. 132, s. 22 (1) (b).
4 To present this ground o f appeal the appellants had to overcome the 
respondents’ objections that as the strike was now over the case was o f  
merely academic interest. The court held that this was a question o f law 
sufficiently important to warrant a decision.
5 (1852), 1 De G. & Sm. 604, 42 E.R. 687.
6 [1936] 3 All E.R. 160 (K .B.D.).
7 [1967] S.C.R. 628, at p. 640.
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action to break this contract and to disobey the statute law o f the 
province.8
By partic ipa ting  in a trade un ion  upon  w hich he has bestow ed 
his bargain ing  rights, the  m odern  industria l citizen has in effect 
w aived the  recognized rights o f  those w hose co n trac ts  o f  service a re  
unaffected by trad e  unions. This is because the com plexity  o f  m odern  
industria l rela tions, the im personal na tu re  o f  big business, an d  the  
“ space age”  la tera l m obility o f  em ployees have drastically  a ltered  
the m aster an d  servant re la tionsh ip .9 T oday , in m ost q u arte rs , the  
negotiation  o f  the  m aster and  servant rela tionsh ip  has been replaced 
by the  rivalry o f  arch-enem ies, gargan tuan  public co rp o ra tio n s  an d  
pow erful in te rnationally  organized trad e  unions. In a  serious a ttem p t 
by the  sta te  to  supervise and  con tro l the bargain ing  process o f  these 
tw o m am m oth  forces in society, L ab o u r R elations A cts have been 
im plem ented in m ost English-speaking ju risd ic tions.
S. 22 (l)(b ) o f  the M an itoba  L ab o u r R e la tions A c t,10 w hich is 
ana logous to  s. 21 (1 )(b) o f  the N ew  B runsw ick A ct,11 provides th a t:
Except in respect o f a dispute that is subject to subsection (2) during 
the term o f the collective agreement, no employee bound by a collec­
tive agreement or on whose behalf a collective agreement has been 
entered into, whether entered into before or after the coming into 
force o f the Revised Statutes, shall go on strike; and no bargaining 
agent that is a party to the agreement shall declare or authorize a 
strike o f any such employee.
U nder s. 44(3) o f  the M an itoba  A ct, ana logous to  s. 39(3) o f  
the N ew  B runsw ick sta tu te , the penalty  for vio lating  s. 22 (l)(b ) is 
a  fine o f  one hundred  and  fifty dollars for each day th a t the  strike 
exists, payable by the  union th a t declares o r  au tho rizes the strike.
Injunctive relief is available a t the  suit o f  a  p rivate p la in tiff to  
prevent the v io la tion  o f  a s ta tu te , if  the v io la tion  o f  the s ta tu te  w ould  
cause the  p la in tiff dam age g reater than  th a t suffered by society 
in general.12
G enera lizations concerning the availability  o f  injunctive relief 
to  enforce a sta tu te  o r no-strike clause are  subject to  the  equ itab le
8 Ibid.
9 “The complexity o f labour-management relations in a highly industrialized 
civilization were presumably not even thought o f [when Lumley v. Wagner 
was decided]” : W'peg. Builder's Exchange et al. v. I.B.E.W., Local Union 
2085 et al. (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 141, at p. 157 (Monnin J. A.), approved 
on appeal, [1967] S.C.R. 628, at p. 639 (Cartwright C. J. C.).
10 Supra, note 3.
11 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 124.
12 The cases are collected and discussed by Baxter C.J. in New Brunswick 
Power Company v. Maritime Transit Limited (1936), 11 M .P.R. 174 (N .B ., 
Ch.D.).
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principles w hich lim it the use o f  the injunctive rem edy.13 These 
principles sta te  th a t an  in junction  will n o t be g ran ted  w here pecuniary 
dam ages w ould be adequate , co n stan t supervision w ould be neces­
sary, the co n trac t sough t to  be enforced is harsh , am biguous o r 
against public policy, o r  involuntary  servitude w ould  result.
E quitab le rem edies are  ex trao rd inary  and  a  p la in tiff m ay ob ta in  
relief from  C hancery  only  w hen no adequate  rem edy m ay be had 
a t law .14 In num erous cases this principle has been reaffirm ed. T he 
Electrical Workers' case effectively circum vented this con ten tious 
issue by holding th a t the  in junction  is the only adequate  rem edy in 
lab o u r ba ttle s.15 In circum stances w here dam ages ough t to  be 
g ran ted ,16 in the absence o f  enabling  leg isla tion ,17 no ac tion  for 
dam ages18 fo r v io lation  o f  a L abour R elations A ct a lo n e19 can 
be m ain ta ined .
N either an  in junction  nor an  o rd er fo r specific perform ance 
will be g ran ted  if adequate  enforcem ent w ould en tail constan t super­
13 “The mere fact that the contract or covenant in question is clear, and the 
breach is clear, is not o f  itself sufficient to warrant the interference o f the 
court unless the contract or covenant is itself o f such a nature that it can 
be enforced consistently with the rules and principles upon which the court 
acts in granting relief” : Halsbury’s Laws o f England (3rd ed.. Vol. 21), 
at p. 380.
14 London & Blackwell Ry. Co. v. Cross (1886), 31 Ch.D. 354, at p. 369 (C.A.).
15 [1967] S.C.R. 628, at p. 641. But see Lambert, The Use o f the Civil Injunction 
in Labour Disputes, [1966] Can. Bar Papers 169; Kravetz, Memorandum on 
the Labour Injunction, [1966] Can. Bar Papers 183.
16 But see Hodgson v. Duce (1856), 4 W.R. 576, where the defendant was a 
pauper and the plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain him from 
trespassing because against a pauper damages did not constitute an ade­
quate remedy.
17 S. 18 o f the New Brunswick Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 124, 
is a good attempt at providing a covenant upon which an action could 
be brought.
18 There is an ancillary remedy in equity by injunction to protect a right 
which is being threatened: New Brunswick Power Company v. Maritime 
Transit Limited (1936), Il M.P.R. 174, at p. 188 (N .B ., Ch.D.).
19 Subject to the exception expressed in footnote 18, there is a general 
rule “ . . .  that where a new offence and a penalty for it [was] created by 
statute a person proceeding under the statute was confined to the recovery 
o f the penalty and that no other relief could be asked for.": Cooper v. 
fVhittingham (1881), 49 L.J. Ch. 752, at p. 755 (Jessell M .R.), quoted with 
approval in New Brunswick Power Company v. Maritime Transport Limited 
(1936), 11 M.P.R. 174, at p. 188 (N.B., Ch.D.). Thus the employer would 
have no right to obtain an injunction to prevent his employees from com ­
mitting an unfair labour practice which was not contrary to the collective 
agreement or a tort at common law: Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Ltd., 
[1961] S.C.R. 435.
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vision by the co u rt.20 Based on  the  prem ise th a t the cou rt should  
never g ran t an  in junction  w hich is bu t an  em pty th rea t,21 this rule 
is a  resu lt o f  the  lack  o f  availab le adm inistrative m achinery to  
enforce such orders.22
M ore than  a  cen tury  ago  English courts  developed an  exception 
to  this ru le in cases w here the  defendan t took  land  from  a landow ner 
o n  the  cond ition  th a t the defendan t w ould build som ething upon  the 
land . In  such cases, a t  the  su it o f  the  landow ner, cou rts  have held 
th a t as dam ages w ould  be com pletely  inadequate, an  o rd er  for 
specific perform ance is the only  p ro p e r rem edy.23 In Wilson v. 
Furness Ry.24 the  co u rt w ent to  g reat lengths to  supervise the specific 
perform ance o f  the p articu la r undertak ing .25 This interesting excep­
tio n  suggests th a t the  courts  do  have the d iscretion to  g ran t an  
in junction  w here constan t supervision w ould be necessary. A lthough  
th is p roposition  was no t referred to  by the Suprem e C o u rt, the 
sp irit o f  it is p resent in the judgem ent.
T he age old m axim , “ H e w ho com es into equity  m ust com e with 
clean hands” ,26 undoubted ly  will apply  in cases like the Electrical 
Workers'. In  such instances, d isrespect for a collective agreem ent 
w hich is am biguous, harsh  o r  against public policy will p robab ly  
n o t be enjoinable as a  breach o f  the  agreem ent o r violation o f  the 
s ta tu te .27
In d istinguishing the  invo lun tary  servitude o f  an  individual from  
the  forced em ploym ent o f  un ion  m em bers, the Suprem e C o u rt 
reached  a  decision o f  considerable significance. A lthough  the  rule 
aga in st involuntary  servitude is readily  identifiable w ith cases like 
Lumley v. Wagner28 w hich involved a single individual, its origin 
is to  be found in Magna Charta.
20 Kingston v. Kingston, P. & C. Elec. Ry. (1898), 25 O.A.R. 462; Ryan v. 
Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Assocn., [1893] 1 Ch. 116 (C.A.).
21 An empty threat, or brut urn fulmen, may be present when the proposed 
injunction is not beyond the jurisdiction o f the court, but is only impractical 
to enforce. See A.-G. v. International Bridge Co. (1875), 22 Gr. 298.
22 Reminders that the military is available to enforce an order of the court, 
hardly make the fact that large scale disrespect o f the law is bad per se, 
less obvious. In labour problems, the difficulty presented by mass contempt, 
is a subject which must not be oversimplified. See Kravetz, Memorandum 
on the Labour Injunction, [1966] Can. Bar Papers 183, at p. 188.
23 G . C. Cheshire and C. H. S. Fifoot, The Law o f Contract (6th ed., 1964), 
at p. 536.
24 (1868), L.R. 9 Eq. 28.
25 Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Assocn., [1893] 1 Ch. 116, 
at p. 128 (Kay L.J.).
26 See, generally, Halsbury’s Laws o f England (3rd ed., Vol. 14), at p. 530.
27 Kimberley v. Jennings (1836), 6 Sim. 340, 58 E.R. 621.
28 Supra, footnote 5.
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T he C h a rte r  guaran teed  in C h ap te r 39 th a t . .  no  freem an 
shall be taken  an d  im prisoned  o r  disseised o r  exiled o r  in any  way 
destroyed . . .  except by the law ful ju d g m en t o f  his peers a n d  by the  
law o f  the lan d .”  By a  s ta tu te  called Confirmatio Cartarum, the  
C h a rte r  was directed  “ . . .  to  be allow ed as the  com m on law . . . ”  
and  all judgm en ts  co n tra ry  to  it were declared void.29 B lackstone 
said th a t M agna Charta “ . . .  contained  very few new g ran ts, bu t 
as Sir E dw ard  C oke observed, was fo r the m ost p a r t dec lara to ry  
o f  the princip le g rounds o f  th e  fundam ental laws o f  E ng land .” 30
T h e controversial C anad ian  Bill o f  R ights was enacted  in 
I960.31 I t is a  w eak32 a ttem p t33 to  establish th a t parliam ent recognizes 
and  declares th a t there have existed an d  will con tinue to  exist in 
C an ad a  certa in  hum an  rights and  fundam ental freedom s. They 
include “ . . .  the  righ t o f  the  individual to  life, liberty , security  o f  
the person  an d  en joym ent o f  p roperty , and  the  right n o t to  be 
deprived th e reo f except by due process o f  law.” 34 T he A ct was no t 
entrenched  in the C onstitu tion . In  extending the due process doctrine  
o f  M agna Charta to  con tro l parliam en t, a t  its ow n d iscretion ,35 the  
Bill o f  R ights also  has the rem arkab le effect o f  being a  C anad ian  
sta tu te , Confirmatio Cartarum .36
B lackstone th o u g h t the  due process clause o f  M agna Charta 
enshrined  civil liberties. H e defined civil liberty  as “ . . .  natu ra l
29 (1297), 25 Edw. J, c. 29.
30 1 Bl. Comm. 127-128.
31 (1960), 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 44 (Can.).
32 See, Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd ed., 1966), at p. 976.
33 Louie Yuet Sun v. The Queen, [1961] S.C.R. 70; and Rebrin v. Bird and 
Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration, [1961] S.C.R. 376: these cases 
show that thus far the Supreme Court has declined to strengthen the in­
herent metaphysical qualities o f the phrase “due process o f law” .
34 (1960), 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 44, s. 1 (a).
35 Parliament may declare a law to operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights:
Ibid., s. 2.
36 Because “ . . .  there is federal common or decisional law and provincial 
common or decisional law according to the matters respectively distributed 
to each legislature by the B.N.A. Act” (Laskin, supra, footnote 32, at p. 817), 
then the Canadian Bill o f Rights is a statute Confirmatio Cartarum only 
within the sphere of the “federal common law” . Magna Charta nevertheless 
is a part o f the common law o f the English speaking provinces o f Can­
ada. In R. v. McLaughlin (1830), 1 N.B.R. 218, and in the note following 
the case, the principles o f the admission o f the common law into the col­
onies are discussed.
In Quebec, Magna Charta probably does not apply, despite the contention 
that the words “ with a Constitution similar in principle to the United 
Kingdom” in the preamble o f  the B.N.A. Act, so imply. In Re Provincial 
Fisheries (1895), 26 S.C.R. 444, the court held inter alia that Magna Charta 
is not part o f the law o f Quebec.
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liberty  as fa r  restra ined  by hum an  laws (an d  no fu rther) as is neces­
sary an d  expedient fo r the  general advan tage o f  th e  public .” 37 T h e  
converse o f  th is basic prem ise o f  A ng lo -C anad ian  ju risp ru d en ce  is 
th a t no  one m ay be com pelled to  do  any th ing  unless it is necessary 
an d  expedient fo r the  general advan tage o f  the  public.
T h e  Suprem e C o u rt w as no t sta tu te  bound  to  decide the  Elec­
trical W orkers' case. In m aking  the ir decision to  en jo in  the  illegal 
strikers an d  in distinguishing the  rule in Lumley v. Wagner, th e  test 
w hich should  have been applied  was w hether o r  no t it w as necessary 
an d  expedient fo r the  general advan tage o f  the  public th a t the  
em ployees be subjected to  involuntary  servitude.
T he proposed  new C anad ian  C onstitu tion , if enacted , will co n ­
ta in  an  entrenched  due process clause. T he Suprem e C o u rt m ay well 
find itself bound  by the  Electrical Workers' decision if it is asked  to  
decide th e  constitu tionality  o f  a sta tu te  com pelling em ploym ent. 
This m ight be undesirab le .38
U ndoub ted ly  exceptions will develop in the general principle 
th a t illegal strikers m ay be enjoined to  re tu rn  to  w ork. T h e  estab lish ­
m ent o f  a p rocedure w hich will enable aggrieved parties to  ob ta in  
dam ages fo r v io lation  o f  the  L ab o u r R elations A ct a lo n e ; jud ic ia l 
definition o f  w hich collective agreem ents are am biguous, harsh  o r  
aga inst public policy; reapplications o f  the law  against invo lun tary  
servitude to  the la b o u r rela tions p rob lem ; and  difficulties in the 
enforcem ent o f  in junctions all will lead to  a  m ore sophisticated  
m ethod  o f  enforcing C anad ian  lab o u r law.
H ugh H . M cLellan*
37 1 BI. Comm. 125.
38 In the United States involuntary servitude, or slavery, is expressly prohibited 
by the Thirteenth Amendment. Involuntary servitude has been held to  
encompass the effect o f the injunctive enforcement o f a no-strike clause: 
General Electric Co. v. Int'l Union Etc. (1952), 108 N.E. 2d 211, at pp. 
222-223 (Ohio); but contrast Nevins v. Kasmach (1938), 18 N.E. 2d 294 
(N .Y .). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the only remedies against 
illegally striking employees are discipline, discharge and prosecution: 
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. (1962), 370 U.S. 238.
* Hugh H. McLellan, B.A. Mr. McLellan is a senior law student at the 
University o f New Brunswick.
